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Abstract
This study examined  The International Small Group and Tree Planting Program
(TIST),  a  decentralized  tree  planting  project  with  the  double  objective  of
mitigating  climate  change  and  selling  carbon  credits,  while  also  empowering
subsistence farmers. TIST is certified by the Community, Climate and Biodiversity
Alliance (CCBA),  an independent body which guarantees  that  greenhouse gas
reduction  projects  also  generate  positive  benefits  for  local  communities  and
biodiversity.  The  study  tested  two  rival  perspectives  on  decentralization,  and
assessed whether CCBA lives up to its commitment of  granting net community
benefits through its projects. The key findings were that TIST has empowered poor
subsistence  farmers,  but  has  low  accountability  and  has  reinforced  some
inequalities.  The  overall  conclusion  was  therefore  that  TIST  and  the  CCB
certification  do  generate  net  positive  benefits  for  the  local  community,  even
though only to a moderate degree. As TIST can be considered a most likely case for
successful  decentralization,  this  study  indicated  poor  performance  of
decentralization strategies in general. However, the study also suggested that more
research be carried out on how underlying circumstances affect the outcome of
decentralized governance.
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1. Introduction
Decentralization of power to the local level is a recent trend in natural resource
governance.  Proponents  of  the  concept  stress  that  it  improves  accountability,
empowers people that are usually excluded from decision-making,  and enables
better responsiveness to local needs. However, this positive view of the potential of
decentralization is contested. Critics have noted that decentralization might not
be empowering in practice,  but rather leads to increased inequality since local
elites tend to grab both power and material  assets from decentralized projects.
Scholars have also remarked that decentralized projects often result in high levels
of  corruption.  Decentralization  as  a  means  for  successfully  governing  natural
resources  is  in  other words  controversial,  and  more empirical  research on its
impacts is needed. This thesis hopes to participate in filling this gap of knowledge,
by empirically studying what the impacts of decentralization might be on the local
community.
The  Climate,  Community  and  Biodiversity  Alliance (CCBA)  is  an
independent body that certifies greenhouse gas reduction projects that live up to
certain standards regarding biodiversity and social responsibility. CCBA promotes
a  decentralized,  inclusive  governance  strategy  for its  projects  and  grants  that
certified projects lead to net positive benefits for the local communities. CCBA is
fully  operational  only  since  2011  when  the  first  project  was  verified,  but  its
credibility  has  already been  challenged. Three case studies  carried  out  by the
Swedish Society for Nature Conservation suggest that the CCB certification might
not live up to its commitment of granting net community benefits. 1 Further, the
CCBA certifies projects that sell  carbon credits on the international market for
voluntary carbon offsetting, where companies and other entities can carbon offset
their activities by investing in greenhouse gas reduction projects. The very idea of
forest offset markets as a suitable solution for tackling  challenges of  land use
management is contested, and certifications are perceived by major proponents of
forest offset markets as a key requirement for the markets'  credibility. Credible
1 Eklöf 2013
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certifications is a main argument that carbon projects have moved on from the
days of the ”carbon cowboys”, when unscrupulous investors profited on dubious
forest offset projects.2 For example, carbon projects have been found to restrict
indigenous  people's  and  local  communities'  access  to  traditional  land  and
resources, degrade traditions and cause conflicts, or damage native ecosystems.3 If
certification schemes such as CCB do not provide sufficient quality insurance, a
major argument in favor of forest offset markets is challenged. There is clearly a
need to further evaluate CCB's performance,  and very little research has been
carried out so far. This study wishes to contribute to the debate on certification
schemes for carbon offsetting  by examining  whether The International  Small-
Group and Tree Planting Program (TIST), a CCB verified project located in south
India, has led to net positive impacts for the local community. The study does not
examine  biodiversity  impacts  from  the  project,  though  acknowledges  the
importance of evaluating this aspect of the CCB certification as well. 
Chapter  2  reviews  the  literature  on  governance  of  natural  resource
management,  focusing  specifically  on  theories  on  decentralization.  Potential
positive  and  negative  impacts  on  local  communities  associated  with
decentralization are outlined,  and key concepts  are defined.  In  chapter 3,  the
methodological choices, including research design and method for data collection,
are described and motivated. The results and analysis are presented in chapter 4,
and finally the conclusions in chapter 5. 
2. Theoretical framework
This chapter introduces the challenges of natural resource management and the
need for effective governance.  Secondly,  it presents an overview of  the critique
towards  classical  forms  of  governance  that  has  lead  to  the  promotion  of
decentralization,  which is  today a major trend  in  governance theory.  The last
section outlines potential positive and negative impacts from decentralization that
advocates and critics of the concept emphasize respectively. 
2 Eklöf 2013
3 CCBA 2013b
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2. 1. Deforestation – a collective action problem
Deforestation  of  the  world's  forests  occurres  at  a  high  rate,  which  has  both
environmental, social and economic consequences. Decreasing forest cover means
biodiversity loss, decreasing provision of ecosystem services and loss of livelihood,
which affects both present and coming generations' abilities to meet their needs.
Lately, insights have risen of the importance of deforestation for climate change.
The world's  forests  constitute  an  important  carbon  sink,  and  deforestation  is
estimated to account for 20% of total global emissions of green house gases.4
Deforestation is a typical example of a collective action problem, defined as
a situation in which multiple individuals would all benefit from a certain action,
but has an associated cost making it implausible that any one individual can or
will undertake it alone.5 Most humans would benefit from keeping an extensive
tree cover. However, planting trees, or refraining from cutting trees, is associated
with a cost, which means that no individual will have the incentive to take these
steps alone. There is in other words a conflict between individual and collective
rationality.  Garrett  Hardin  describes  this  phenomena  as  a  ”tragedy  of  the
commons”,  and  explains  why  resource  depletion  takes  place.  A  common-pool
resource, such as forests, is characterized by rivalry and non-excludability. Since
each individual  benefits  from continuing  to harvest the resource,  whereas the
costs associated with a degraded resource are shared collectively, the resource will
inevitably be depleted.6 The challenge is to change the incentive structure and
make each individual act in a way that benefits the collective; in other words, make
individual  rationality  correspond  with  collective rationality.  To solve collective
action problems, some form of governance is needed. 
2.2. Defining environmental governance
Governance  can  be  defined  as  a  ”social  function  centered  on  efforts  to  steer
societies or human groups toward collectively beneficial outcomes and away from
outcomes that are collectively harmful”.7 Governance encompasses actors such as
the state, communities, private companies and non-governmental organizations,
4 Eklöf 2011
5 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics 2009
6 Lundqvist 2009
7 Delmas and Young 2009:6
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and can take the form of international accords, national policies and legislation,
transnational  institutions  and  more8.  Governance can thus  vary in  shape and
content but has one objective in common; to solve collective action problems. 
In a time of dramatic increases in the scope and intensity of the impact of
human actions on the world's  ecosystems,  governance is  perhaps needed now
more than ever. After the consolidation of the sustainable development paradigm,
governance is now expected to take into account not only environmental issues
but also social  and  economic concerns.9 There is  thus  a  growing  demand  for
effective governance. It is in light of this that the CCB certification can be viewed:
as a means of responding to the need for forest governance by taking both social,
economic and environmental considerations into account. 
2.3. Historical review of environmental governance
Concepts of natural resource governance have changed rapidly during the second
half of the 20th century10, and a short review of these changes will be given in this
section, as well as a presentation of the main forms of governance. 
Historically,  the  state has  been  conceived  the  given agent  of  natural
resource  governance.  The  state  was  expected  to  manage  natural  resources  by
legislation and enforcement. Thanks to its infrastructure, specialized personnel,
budget and coercive control,  the state was considered the best suited actor to
resolve environmental issues.
However, by the late 1970's and early 1980's this view was challenged, for
several reasons. With a nascent globalization, including increasing international
trade  and  growing  economic,  social  and  political  interactions  across  nation
borders,  the state gradually lost its  governing capacity.  Awareness grew of  the
limitations of the state, including its ineffectiveness and lack of flexibility.11 The
combined effect of loss of both state capacity and faith in the abilities of the state
led  to the appearance of  alternative means of  governance.  Within the field  of
natural resource governance, market-based solutions were  promoted to address
the  inefficiencies  associated  with  state  governance,  and  to  enable  greater
8 Lemos & Agrawal 2006
9 Delmas and Young 2009
10 Shabbir Cheema and Rondinelli 2007
11 Delmas and Young 2009
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profitability in the utilization of natural resources.12 Codes of conduct, certification
schemes  and  other  voluntary  mechanisms  are  examples  of  this  form  of
governance.  However,  critical  voices  have been  raised  regarding  the increased
recourse to  market-based  solutions.  Social  goals  might  be undermined  as  the
market is unable to take these into account, and market governance might lead to
unequal allocation and unequal access to natural resources. Accountability and
legitimacy are also important challenges for the market governance approach.13 
During  the  late  20th century,  a  third  governance  approach  grew  in
importance,  namely  decentralization.  Development  theory  shifted  towards
participatory  development  and  growth-with-equity  objectives,  which  led  to
increasing calls for decentralization.14 This shift could also be observed within the
field  of  environmental  governance and decentralization is  today a major trend
shaping environmental governance.15 As the following section will show, however,
decentralized governance has not been spared from objections and its impacts
remain contested. 
2.4. Decentralization – a contested strategy 
This  section  outlines  potential  benefits  and  problems  associated  with
decentralization, with an emphasize on natural resource management in a context
of  developing countries. 
Decentralization is the transfer of power to local level administrative units
and social groups.16 One of  its main objectives is to reverse power relations and
empower  people  that  are  commonly  excluded  from  decision-making.17
Empowerment is defined by the World Bank as  ”the process of  increasing the
capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices
into desired actions and outcomes”.18 It concerns both institutional structure and
individual capacity. Important aspects of the institutional structure include access
to information, and accountability, which  is defined by the World Bank as ”the
12 Lemos and Agrawal 2006
13 Ibid.
14 Shabbir Cheema and Rondinelli 2007
15 Lemos and Agrawal 2006
16 Ibid.
17 See e.g. Binswanger-Mhkize et al. 2010, and Mansuri and Rao 2004
18 World Bank PovertyNet 2014b
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ability to call public officials, private employers, or service providers to account,
requiring that they be answerable for their policies, actions, and use of funds”. 19
Participation  in  decision-making  processes  is  also  an  important  aspect  of
empowerment and is considered both an end in itself and a means for obtaining
better  decisions.  Since  information  problems  are  reduced,  participation  is
expected  to  lead  to  better  designed  projects,  and  more  equitably  distributed
project benefits.20 Decisions-makers can also take advantage of precise time- and
place-specific  knowledge,  thereby  improving  the  targeting  of  e.g.  poverty
programs, and increasing the responsiveness to local  needs.21 Exit options,  that
enable dissatisfied members  to quit a collectivity,  are commonly considered an
important feature of empowerment as it prevents that members are exploited.22
On  an  individual  basis,  empowerment  means  increasing  assets,  which
refers  to  material  assets  and  include  land,  housing,  livestock,  savings,  and
jewelry.23 Empowerment also means increasing capabilities, which are inherent in
people and enable them to use their assets  in different ways to increase their
wellbeing. Capabilities can be divided into human capabilities, which include good
health,  education,  and  productive or other life-enhancing  skills;  psychological
capabilities, including  self-esteem,  self-confidence,  and  ability  to  imagine  and
aspire to a better future; and  social capabilities,  including social belonging and
values that give meaning to life.24 By strengthening organizations that represent
poor people, the organizational capacity could be enhanced25, and particularly the
communities'  capabilities  to  undertake  self-initiated  development  activities.26
Another important aspect of social capabilities that decentralization is expected to
boost is social capital, which Putnam defines as ”the collective value of all ”social
networks” and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each
19 World Bank PovertyNet 2014a
20 Mansuri and Rao 2004
21 Lemos and Agrawal 2006
22 Warren 2011
23 Narajan 2002
24 Ibid.
25 Mansuri and Rao 2004
26 Casey, Glennerster and Miguel 2010
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other."27 Social capital is also commonly referred to as the level of  trust among
people.28 
Decentralization is also expected to  generate increased local-level market
activity,  and  increased  legitimacy  for  decisions,  since  those  affected  by  the
decisions are included in the decision-making process.29 
Community  governance is  sometimes  put  in  relation to  the concept  of
”good governance”, a term used to describe characteristic traits among successful
policy systems. The United Nations define good governance as having eight major
characteristics:  it is participatory, consensus  oriented, accountable,  transparent,
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of
law.30 Proponents  of  community  governance  often  state  precisely  these
characteristics as being typical for community governance.
However,  scholars  have shown that  there  might  be serious  unintended
effects of decentralization, which has led to a questioning of the appropriateness
of  the  decentralization  approach.  Firstly,  it  is  debated  whether  the  positive
impacts mentioned above actually occur in practice. For example, Mansuri and
Rao31 emphasize  that  decentralization  might  not  be  a  successful  means  of
empowering poor people. The concept of participation might be used to legitimize
the project's previously established priorities, and might not improve the match
between what a community needs and what it obtains. Others have shown that, in
practice, participation might require complex institutional changes, which has led
project implementers to include stakeholders only at some stages of the project,
commonly  excluding  stages  such  as  budgeting  and  designing  the  project.32
Golooba-Mutebi33 also highlights  that  participation  might  be time-consuming,
thereby putting more pressure on already overworked people. Mansuri and Rao
question  whether  decentralization  actually  leads  to  reversed  power  relations.
Instead, they argue, studies have shown that local elites often grab both power and
material benefits from decentralized projects,  thereby reinforcing existing power
27 Putnam 2000:19
28 Keeley 2007
29 Young 2009
30 UNESCAP  
31 Mansuri and Rao 2004
32 Biswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010
33 Golooba-Mutebi 2004
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structures  and  increasing  inequality.  Case  studies  have  shown  that  wealthier,
better-networked individuals with strong bargaining power are likely to dominate
decision-making.34 
Critics of  community governance argue that the dispersion of  power also
constitutes  a  risk  for  corruption.35 Corruption,  defined  by  Transparency
International as ”the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”, not only includes
bribery but also embezzlement (the taking or conversion of  money, property or
valuable items by an individual who is not entitled to them but has access to them
by virtue of  their position)  and favoritism (the favorable treatment of  friends,
business  associates  and  family  in  the  distribution  of  resources  and  positions,
regardless of their objective merits).36
Mansuri  and  Rao  highlight  that  communities  vary  in  their ability  to
mobilize  information  and  monitor  disbursements,  which  creates  further
opportunities for both elite capture and corruption. There is also some evidence
that the infusion of outside financial assistance for community groups may lead to
rapidly changing group composition, including the accelerated departure from the
group of the most socially marginalized individuals.37
As can be seen from this review, there is no clear answer to the question
whether or not community governance should be promoted as a means to cope
with collective action problems. In summary, advocates of decentralization stress
that  it  leads  to  empowerment,  including  structural  components  such  as
participation, access to information and exit, and individual components such as
assets and capabilities. Other potential positive impacts include increased local-
level market activity, responsiveness to local needs and accountability. Potential
negative impacts from decentralization are corruption,  elite capture,  inequality
and changing group composition. 
2.5. Aim of the study and research question
In the light of the above-described controversy on decentralization, it is evident
that more research is needed on its impacts on local communities. This study aims
34 Mansuri and Rao 2004
35 Ibid.
36 Transparency International 2013b
37 Casey, Glennerster and Miguel 2010
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at contributing to the theory formation on sustainable management of  natural
resources, by answering the following question: 
 Do CCBA's decentralization ambitions lead to the advantages asserted by
advocates of community governance?
3. Method
In this section, the methodological choices for answering the research question are
described and motivated. These choices concern research design, method for data
collection, ethical and reliability considerations, and finally operationalizations of
key concepts and criteria for drawing conclusions.
3.1. Research design
For the purpose of this study, a single case design was chosen. The reason behind
this choice is firstly that the study aims at examining a complex problem: the
impacts  on the local  community of  a certain  governance strategy.  In order to
increase the internal validity, it is desirable to include as many potential impacts as
possible.  The impacts studied are themselves highly complex,  which requires a
design that allows for in-depth analysis. 
Secondly, the CCB standards are a relatively recent phenomena, and there
are currently few projects that have received the verification.38 The cases are also
geographically dispersed,  which means it would be highly impractical  to study
more than one case. Due to practical limits, a comparative design has therefore
been opted out.
One could argue however, that the study is a so called within-case analysis,
since it aims at describing a change over time within a community. Even though
interviews  were  carried  out  at  only  one  point  in  time,  the  interviewees  were
continuously asked  to  evaluate the change within their  community  after they
joined TIST.  Regardless of  the terminological  concerns,  the design chosen will
allow  for  drawing  conclusions  on  what  impacts  TIST  has  had  for  the  local
community. 
38 The CCB certification has two steps: firstly, a validation that guarantees a good project design, and 
secondly a verification that is an independent endorsement of the quality of project implementation.
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3.2. Case selection
The case chosen for this study is a CCB verified tree planting project named TIST,
located in Tamil Nadu, India. TIST is based on subsistence farmers offsetting some
of their agricultural land for planting trees, thereby sequestering carbon. Farmers
join on an individual basis and each farmer plants trees on their own land, thereby
retaining ownership of the land and the trees. A for-profit company called Clean
Air Action Corporation (CAAC) funds TIST and administers the selling of carbon
credits  generated  by  the  tree  planting.  The  carbon  credits  are  sold  on  the
international voluntary market for carbon offsets, to companies and other entities
that wish to carbon offset their activities. During the project's lifespan, the farmers
receive  70%  of  the  carbon  credit  revenues,  and  the  remaining  30%  goes  to
administration of the project and profit for CAAC. The farmers receive a quarterly
carbon payment based on number of trees, and the remaining sum after 20 years.
TIST  organizes  the farmers  into  small  groups  of  6  to  12  persons  that  should
provide mutual support. Representatives from the different small groups engage in
monthly  node  meetings,  in  order  to  exchange  information,  develop  ”best
practices” and receive training and education. The double aim of the program is to
mitigate climate change and empower poor subsistence farmers.
The project has a high degree of decentralization since the tree planting,
which is the backbone of the program, is completely controlled by the farmers.
The farmers decide when and where to plant, how many trees and what  species. 
Judging from TIST's project design,  TIST can be expected  to have good
conditions  for  successful  governance.  The  small  groups  can  be  expected  to
safeguard  inclusion  and  empowerment,  and  since  the  project  is  supposed  to
practice rotating leadership,  the risk of  domination of  local  elites and unequal
allocation  of  project  benefits  should  be  limited.  Continuous  education  and
knowledge exchange within and between small groups could be expected to boost
human  and  social  capital,  voluntary  participation  should  reduce  the  risk  for
involuntary relocation, and so on. It is thus motivated to consider TIST a  most
likely case for successful decentralized governance. In other words, if the problems
emphasized by critics of decentralization have arisen within TIST, that would be a
strong indicator that the critics are right.
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3.3. Semi-structured interviews 
The method  of  data collection  employed  was semi-structured  interviews  with
farmers involved in the project. The farmers are the central actors in the research
question, since the study aims at describing the impacts of the project on the local
community. 
The method chosen allows for examining the farmers' own experiences of
the project. For many of  the variables studied (as presented in further detail in
chapter 3.7),  it is not primarily objective facts that are in focus but rather the
farmers' subjective view of certain phenomena. For example, the study is not only
examining whether people are  formally included in decision-making processes,
but also whether they  feel included. For other variables included in the study it
would  have been preferable to combine the interviews  with  e.g.  a survey.  For
variables such as corruption, not only the individuals' perceptions of corruption
are of  interest,  but also the actual,  objective level  of  corruption.  However,  the
survey option was not practically feasible in this  case,  since the farmers  were
geographically dispersed and difficult to reach. The study was therefore limited to
13  semi-structured  interviews.  The  limitations  resulting  from  this  choice  of
method should be kept in mind when drawing conclusions from the data. 
The  interviews  were  structured  around  central  themes  corresponding
roughly to eight variables relevant for this study (as described in chapter 3.7.). An
interview guide (see Appendix 1) was prepared, and the same type of questions was
asked  to  all  respondents.  Open  questions  with  follow-ups  were  used,  which
allowed the farmers to explain their views, and to further develop answers and give
examples. 
The manager of TIST India was interviewed in order to shed some light on
the general  functioning of  TIST.  Since the person interviewed was the highest
official of TIST India, it might be in his interest to give a somewhat embellished
description of  the project.  His answers have therefore been critically analyzed,
mainly in relation to the farmers'  experiences.  The information from the TIST
manager was also complemented by a review of documents relating to TIST, such
as their Validation Report to CCB. It turned out, however, that some discrepancies
existed  between  documents  and  reality,  and  the  documents  have  also  been
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analyzed with caution.
3.4. Selection of interviewees
The interviewees were chosen strategically according to the principle of maximal
variation, since the study aims at covering all variations in experience within the
communities in TIST. First of all, five villages in three different geographical areas
were chosen, which means that the interviewees belonged to three different nodes
and had different local TIST agents. The interviewees varied in age, length of TIST
membership,  position  within  the  community,  and  position  within  their  small
group.  There was also some distribution among richer and  poorer individuals
within the villages. The interviews were continued until theoretical saturation was
obtained, which occurred after 13 interviews. 
Important to notice is that only men were interviewed. This was first of all
due to the fact that only men were members of the project in the villages visited.
India is often ranked as one of the world's most gender-biased countries39 and this
structure was also found in the villages visited. The common order seemed to be
that the man in the household took responsibility for the breadwinning, thereby
taking all decisions concerning the farm land and the tree plantation. I searched
for women with some knowledge about TIST even though they were not officially
members,  but  it  was  very  hard  finding  any.  The  tree  planting  and  the  TIST
membership was clearly the man's business,  and the benefits from the project
were likewise distributed to the man.  In some cases,  the woman in the family
participated during the interview, and some questions were put directly to her. The
information gained from women was however limited  in scope.  Although this
might seem like a limitation of the study, it is also a result in itself that no women
were involved  in  the project.  TIST has  failed  to  empower women,  other than
indirectly as the household is empowered. The implications of  this finding are
further discussed in the Results section.
One should also notice that the choice of interviewees was not random, and
the study has no ambition of quantifying the answers obtained. 
39 See e.g. the OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index, where India in 2012 was ranked as 
Medium/High level of discrimination against women.  
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3.5. Ethical considerations
None of the themes treated during the interviews could be considered particularly
sensitive but the interviewees were granted anonymity,  which was primarily to
allow them to speak freely about their experience of the project without risking
any kind of reprisals from TIST. The interviewees were informed of the aim of the
interview before it took place, and they were also invited to ask questions. No one
refused to participate, neither before nor after the interview was carried out. 
3.6. Use of interpreter and other reliability concerns
Since all  interviewees spoke Tamil,  a Tamil-English interpreter was used for all
interviews but one (which was carried out in English). The use of interpreter is
problematic,  as  interviewing  is  less  flexible and the quality  of  the translation
might be difficult to evaluate.40 In order to minimize the risk of inaccurate results,
the interpreter was carefully introduced to the subject,  and the importance of
precision was emphasized. 
In order to increase reliability, all interviews were recorded and thoroughly
transcribed. 
3.7. Operationalizations 
The potential  positive and negative impacts from decentralization identified in
chapter 2 are summarized in table 1.  These variables are operationalized in the
following  section,  in  the  same  order  as  they  appear  in  Table  1.  All
operationalizations are based on the definitions presented in chapter 2.4.. As can
be seen from the table, there are quite a few theoretical concepts that need to be
operationalized. For many of the concepts, the measurement is quite complex, 
Table 1. Potential positive and negative impacts from decentralization.
Potential negative impacts Potential positive impact
Corruption Empowerment
Inequality Increased village-level market activity
Elite capture Accountability
Changing group compsition Responsiveness to local needs
40 Bragason 1997
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which could affect the internal  validity.  In order to increase the validity,  well-
established operationalizations were used as far as possible. During the interviews,
several questions were put on the same topic, to ensure correspondence. 
Corruption was operationalized through a number of questions, which were
all  derived  from  Transparency  International's  survey  questionnaire41.  The
interviewees  were asked  questions  on bribery,  rules  and  regulations  regarding
distribution  of  money  and  other  material  benefits,  and  embezzlement  and
favoritism. Lastly, they were asked whether they thought the frequency of this type
of phenomena had changed in their village after they joined TIST. 
As  for  the  Inequality variable,  questions  were  asked  so  as  to  enable
comparisons between non-members and members, between members of the same
village, and between members of different villages. The interviewees were asked
questions on how the distribution of benefits usually took place, and whether they
perceived the distribution as equal.
Elite  capture was  measured  by  asking  questions  on  the  distribution  of
power within the project.  Power was measured as ability to achieve one's will,
which is a simplification of Weber's definition of power.42 The interviewees were
also asked about the leadership within the project. 
Changing  group  composition was  measured  by  asking  the  interviewees
whether someone had moved from the village after the project started up, and if
so, for what reason. 
As  for  empowerment,  the  aim was  to  include as  many aspects  of  it  as
possible,  both  concerning  institutional  climate  and  individual  capacity.  The
institutional  climate  was  firstly  measured  by  assessing  the  farmers'  access  to
information, by asking the interviewees about their means of communication with
the project staff and other members. They were also asked about their opinion of
the access to information, and their knowledge about the project and their rights
and responsibilities.  Participation was measured by asking about the decision-
making processes within the project.  The interviewees were also asked during
which parts  of  the project (such as  planning,  budgeting,  implementation and
41 See Transparency International 2013a
42 Namely,  ”the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out 
his own will despite resistance..” (Weber 1978:53)
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evaluation) they had had a say, and to what extent they felt that their priorities,
needs and preferences were taken into account.43 Exit options were also measured,
by asking the members whether they thought it would be easy or difficult to quit
the  project  if  they  wanted  to.  As  for  individual  assets  and  capabilities,  the
interviewees were asked  about prospects for the future and level  of  health and
education,  and whether these had changed after joining  TIST.  They were also
asked  whether  their  economic  situation  had  changed  due  to  joining  TIST.
Organizational capacity was measured by asking whether the TIST members were
cooperating on other matters than the tree plantations, in order to see if TIST had
increased  their capabilities  to undertake self-initiated  activities.  Social  capital,
another  capability,  is  admittedly  difficult  to  operationalize  but  is  commonly
measured as the level of trust. In this study, the World Value Survey44's classical
question  on  trust  was  used.  Finally,  the  interviewees  were  asked  to  evaluate
whether there was any change in level of trust after joining TIST. 
Increased  village-level  market  activity was  measured  by  asking  the
interviewees whether they had noticed any difference at the local  market after
TIST, for example concerning purchase patterns and the number of vendors. 
Accountability was measured by asking the interviewees about their means
of  appealing decisions and to what extent they were able to identify who was
responsible for a certain decision. The extent to which they knew their rights that
came from the TIST membership was also measured. Access to information closely
relates to accountability as the former is a prerequisite for the latter45, and access to
information will therefore be discussed in relation to the accountability. 
When it comes to the  responsiveness to local needs, the character of  this
study makes an objective evaluation impossible.  This variable will  therefore be
based solely on the farmers' own perception of the responsiveness to their needs. 
3.8. Criteria for drawing conclusions
In this section, the criteria for drawing conclusions are described for each of the
variables presented above.
43 These operationalizations are based on the World Bank's Participatory Communication. A Practical 
guide. Tufte and Mefalopulos 2009.
44 World Value Survey 2012
45 Narajan 2002
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When analyzing corruption, it is first examined whether corruption exists
at all within the project. If corruption has occurred, the context will be taken into
consideration.  It  might  not  be  reasonable  to  expect  a  project  in  India  to  be
completely  spared  from  corruption.  To  the  extent  possible,  the  farmers  were
therefore asked to compare the level of corruption in TIST with similar projects. If
the corruption level is higher in TIST than in similar projects, it is considered a
problem, otherwise not.
Inequality is analyzed by comparing the situation before TIST and after. If
inequality has increased it will be considered a problem, otherwise not. 
Elite capture is analyzed by measuring whether some persons have got more
power and other resources from the project. If so, it is examined who these persons
are. Only if they belong to privileged groups will elite capture will be considered a
problem.  Privileged  groups include people that are richer than average in the
village, religious leaders, village presidents, and  leaders of other groups. 
Changing group composition is analyzed by assessing whether somebody
has moved from the area after TIST started up. If somebody has moved, for reasons
that can be related to TIST, changing group composition is considered a problem,
otherwise not. 
As for empowerment, a division is made between institutional climate and
capabilities and assets. The institutional climate concerns access to information,
participation, and exit.  To be considered having good access to information, the
farmers should have some basic information about TIST,  have some means of
actively contacting TIST (e.g. attending a meeting) and themselves consider the
access to information to be good. The evaluation of participation is based both on
formal participation, namely to what extent the farmers have been involved in
different  parts  of  the  project,  and  on  the  farmers'  own  perception  of  their
participation. Any participation at any stage of the project is considered a positive
impact. The same principle is applied to the farmers' own perception; any feeling
of  inclusion  is  considered  a  positive  impact.  Good  exit opportunities  are  a
prerequisite for empowerment, since it ensures that participation in the project is
voluntary. Lack of exit could lead not only to lack of positive impact, but also to
negative impacts such as exploitation of  the farmers.  Lack of  exit is  therefore
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considered a negative impact, whereas good exit opportunities are considered a
positive impact. Exit should be both formally and practically viable for the farmers
in order to be considered good. As for the variables  assets and capabilities,  any
increase in the variables is considered a positive impact.
The variable increased village-level market activity  is considered a positive
impact in case the farmers state that it has increased, otherwise not. 
Accountability is  considered  to be good in case the farmers  are able to
identify who is responsible for different decisions, have some means of protesting
against decisions, and know their rights that come from the TIST membership. 
The results on the responsiveness to local needs are analyzed with caution,
since the method chosen does not allow for comparisons or  quantification. The
analysis is based on the farmers' perception of TIST's responsiveness. In case they
find it good, it is considered a positive impact, otherwise not. 
4. Results and analysis
The following chapter compiles the answers from the interviews in order to assess
whether  the  impacts  summarized  in  Table  1  can  be  identified  in  TIST.  The
variables  are treated  in  the order they  appear in  the  table,  and  are  analyzed
according to the criteria presented in chapter 3.8.
4.1. Corruption
Three different aspects of corruption were studied, namely (1) bribery (including
giving gifts and paying additional fees), (2) rules and regulations regarding the
provision of benefits, and (3) embezzlement and favoritism. 
Regarding  bribery,  the results  were  unequivocal:  no bribing  took  place
within TIST. None of the interviewees had neither paid a bribe, nor been asked to
do so.
When it comes to the distribution of benefits, the rules are clear regarding
the carbon money. Each member receives a certain amount per tree and year, and
no deviation from this rule was discovered.  Regarding other material  benefits,
such as fertilizers and seedlings, there seemed to be no clear rules on how they
should be distributed. Despite this, the interviewees all stated that there were no
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irregularities and that the material benefits were equally distributed within the
group.
Regarding  embezzlement and  favoritism,  the results  were mixed.  Some
interviewees  told  that  there  was  no  corruption  whatsoever  in  TIST.  Other
members said that the TIST agent that comes to their village sometimes charges a
transportation fee much higher than what the transport actually costs,  i.e.  the
agent makes some profit for himself. Some members also said that the TIST agent
sometimes gets seedlings that are supposed to be distributed among the TIST
members. Instead of giving all the seedlings to the farmers, the agent sells some of
them for his own benefit.  In this context, one must however remember that the
Indian  society  in  general  has  a  high  level  of  corruption.  India  scores  36  on
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2013, where 100 is
very clean and 0 highly corrupt, and where a score under 50 indicates ”a serious
corruption problem”46. The members in question also explained that the problem
with the seedlings was not typical to TIST; ”it takes place all over the agriculture
department, TIST, the government, everywhere.” Taking the context into account,
and acknowledging that there is not more corruption in TIST than in other related
areas of society, corruption is not considered a problem within TIST. 
4.2. Inequality
In this section, possible inequalities between the village members that decide to
join  the  project,  and  those  who decide  not  to,  are  examined. Secondly,  it  is
examined whether there are any inequalities between TIST members within the
same  village,  and  thirdly  whether  there  are  any  inequalities  across  different
villages. A fourth aspect concerns gender equality. 
Regarding potential differences between members and non-members, some
interviewees stated that in their village, everybody had been invited to join the
project. They also said that there was no difference in income between those who
became members and those who did not, it was merely a question of interest and
willingness to invest for the future. Other interviewees however stated that only
people that had already planted trees were invited to join the project. This not only
46 Transparency International 2013a. Sweden scores 89, as a comparison. 
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violates  the CCB standards and TIST's  own rules,  but also leads to reinforced
inequalities. One interviewee explained that the primary reason why some people
decided not to plant trees was that they could not find the initial capital necessary.
The same interviewee also said that in the long run, those who had planted trees
would  earn  more.  In  this  context,  TIST's  behavior  is  remarkable.  Instead  of
supporting the economically weaker farmers in the village by providing them with
seedlings and other support, TIST focuses solely on the more privileged village
members by giving them carbon payments and other benefits. Instead of evening
out  inequalities  within  the  village,  TIST  is  in  this  case  reinforcing  existing
inequalities. 
As for TIST members of the same village, no inequality was found, neither in
terms  of material  benefits  nor power.  As  stated  earlier,  the  carbon money  is
distributed  according  to  fixed  rules,  and  other  material  benefits  were  also
distributed equally among the members. Regarding the distribution of power, the
node meetings were mostly for information sharing and usually not for decisions-
making.  The node meetings were led by a TIST agent,  and the common view
among the interviewees was that people were equal within the group. As for the
small  groups,  they were not working as intended in any of  the villages visited.
Their sole function was administrative;  the small  group members received the
carbon payment to the same bank account. Regarding the distribution of material
benefits and money, the unequivocal conclusion is therefore that no inequality can
be observed.
As  for  possible  inequalities  between  members  of  different  villages,  it
appeared that there were major differences in what support the members got from
TIST. First of all, the access to information varied. In one village, there were regular
node meetings where everybody received information. TIST had also helped the
members  set  up  a  microcredit  bank,  and  the  members  were  motivated  and
strengthened by the meetings and the advantages they provided. In other villages,
members  were  never  invited  to  any  node  meetings.  Others  knew  there  were
meetings but were not motivated to attend because they did not find it beneficial
enough. Some farmers were also found to have very limited knowledge of  their
rights and responsibilities. For example, some farmers did not receive their carbon
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payment, without understanding why. The distribution of material benefits across
villages  was  also  very  arbitrary;  some  did  not  receive  anything  at  all,  others
received as much as they wanted. Since all farmers have signed the same contract
with TIST and CAAC, it is highly unfair that they receive different support. CAAC
earns the same amount of money for each farmer, and one can therefore argue that
all farmers should receive the same benefits from TIST.
As for  gender relations, it quickly became clear  when visiting the villages
that women have a very unaspirated role within TIST. In the villages visited, there
was not a single female TIST member. TIST seemed to have adapted to a gender-
biased context and were not taking any active steps47 to alter this power order. The
only impact TIST might have on the gendered power relations is to enhance male
networking and increase men's capabilities, thus further reinforcing the existing
inequality. 
4.3. Elite capture
In  this  section,  the  question  to  be  answered  is  whether  the  local  elite  had
benefited from the project in any way –  by grabbing either power or material
benefits. 
As mentioned, there were no inequalities in the distribution of  material
benefits among the members. As for the distribution of power, there was no sign
that  the  local  elite  had  captured  leading  positions.  Leading  figures,  such  as
religious leaders and village presidents, were found not to have any specific role in
the project. On the contrary, they were either not members, or had unaspirated
roles within the project. The small group leaders were considered economically
equal to the other village members and had not had any other leading role before
TIST. The conclusion must therefore be that no elite capture had occurred. 
4.4. Changing group composition
On this point, the results are unequivocal; in none of the villages visited had there
been any change in group composition. In some cases, people had left the village
for work or studies in bigger cities, but for reasons unrelated to TIST. 
47 According to TIST's project manager, TIST welcomes women as members but are not doing anything 
actively to involve more women. 
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4.5. Empowerment
In  this  section,  different  aspects  of  the institutional  climate and  the farmers'
individual assets and capabilities are discussed. 
4.5.1. Institutional climate
First of all, the access to information is examined. TIST's project design documents
indicates that there are two major means of  communication within the project.
Firstly, representatives from the small groups attend monthly node meetings, and
then spread to their small groups what has been discussed. Secondly, there are
monthly newsletters with information and advice from TIST. However, the node
meetings were not working as intended and many members did not attend them.
The newsletters were distributed in the node meetings, which was unfortunate
since  those  who  did  not  attend  the  meetings  lacked  this  second  source  of
information too.  The means of  communication were therefore very limited for
some farmers.
The  knowledge  about  TIST  varied  a  lot  among  the  members.  Some
members had a basic understanding of  how TIST operates. They might also get
some updates on what is going on within the project.   However, other members
had  very  limited,  if  any,  information  about  the  program in  which  they  were
members.  Some simply  said  they  did  not  know  anything  at  all  about  TIST.
Regarding the budget, none of the interviewees knew anything about it. 
As for the farmers' means of communication with TIST, the answers varied.
One member said he had no means whatsoever to contact TIST. He could not
attend the node meetings and as a consequence did not receive any newsletters,
and he had no other way to contact TIST. Another member had the phone number
to three TIST agents, and could call them at any time: ”if I need information I can
get it fast. If I need anything I contact the three persons, and they will help me
immediately.” 
The farmers own opinions about the access to information varied.  Some
farmers thought the information they got was enough, while others stated they
would like to receive more information from TIST than they presently did.
In conclusion, TIST performs poorly on all aspects of access to information.
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TIST is therefore considered not having empowered the farmers on this point. 
As pointed out in chapter 2.4., participation is another important aspect of
an empowering  institutional  climate.  The original  project design for TIST was
made in 1999. The project has thereafter expanded, keeping basically the same
design.48 The TIST  members  interviewed  for this  study all  joined  the  project
within the last five years, and were therefore not included in the designing of the
project. It was clear however, that the members were participating very actively in
the setting up of their plantations. All farmers chose themselves how much land to
offset for tree planting, and what species to plant. They got advice from TIST on
how to start up and maintain the plantation, but each farmer always decided how
to use his land. Setting-up the plantations was thus highly participatory. When
asked about the extent to which the farmers could influence decisions concerning
TIST, a distinction appeared between issues that concerned the tree plantations,
and issues that related to the overall functioning of the TIST program. On issues
that concerned the tree plantations, some farmers, though not all, thought that
the TIST staff took into account what they thought, for example what they needed
for maintaining the crops or what species of seedlings they wanted.  On matters
regarding the functioning of  the project,  it was however clear that TIST is not
participatory.  Even the members who attended the node meetings did either not
know whether they could influence, or felt they had no power to do so. None of
the interviewees stated that they felt they could influence decisions and priorities
on a project level. The members' limited access to information also limits their
abilities to influence. 
In conclusion, if TIST can be considered participatory on the very local level
regarding  the tree plantations,  it  is  less  so when it  comes to requests  on e.g.
material support. As for the functioning of the project, TIST does not allow any
participation at all. 
The third aspect of institutional climate included in this study is the exit
options.  An important point here is that the farmers are planting trees on their
own land and keep the property rights of both land and trees in case they choose
48 CCBA 2013a
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to quit the project.49 The only economic loss from quitting is that they loose the
future carbon payments, which, however, was noticed beeing of limited economic
importance to the farmers. As for formal obstacles, both TIST's manager and the
farmers agreed that it was easy for the farmers to quit the project. In other words,
there were neither formal nor practical obstacles for the farmers to quit. 
4.5.2. Individual assets and capabilities
For the farmers,  planting  trees  is  a long  term investment,  and the time from
planting to harvesting ranges from 5 to 25  years.  This way,  planting  trees has
certainly increased the farmers' savings. Some farmers also mentioned that the
yield will be an important source of  income for them in the future, that might
enable them to increase their material well-being.
According to TIST's manager, the members are supposed to receive a certain
amount of money after 20 years in the project, corresponding to the rest of the
70% of total carbon earnings they have not received at that point. From TIST's
perspective, giving 70% of the profit directly to the farmers is a major argument
that they are actually empowering the farmers. The farmers however stated that
the carbon payment was of very limited economic importance to them. Further,
none of the members interviewed mentioned the future lump payment after 20
years.  Either  did  they  not  know  about  it,  or  they  considered  it  of  limited
importance as well. In any case, the carbon payments cannot be considered having
any substantial effect on the farmers' assets. 
In one village, TIST had helped setting up a microcredit bank, which several
members  mentioned  as  being  important  to  them. The bank made them save
money  collectively  and  enabled  them  to  get loans,  e.g.  for  setting  up  new
businesses. 
In total, TIST can be considered to enhance farmers' assets. The extent of
this enhancement varies between farmers, but it is clear that TIST has had some
positive impact. 
As for capabilities, TIST's project design documents state that the members
are offered education on HIV, malaria, hygiene, nutrition and other health related
49 CCBA 2013a
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issues, which could be expected to boost human capital. In practice however, none
of the interviewees received any of this education and TIST is therefore judged not
having any direct impact on the health and level of education of the members. 
As for social capabilities, TIST seems to have had some impact, even though
it did not concern all members. Some members had noticed an increase in social
capital. For example, one member said: 
”After joining TIST, there was some trust within the group. If I say
”we used this fertilizer and pesticide before, you can also try this one”,
the others usually trust me and use the same pesticide. Previously, we
usually did not do that.”
Concerning the organizational capacity, it was in some cases clear that TIST
had played a role in increasing the cooperation in the village. For example, one
member explained that after TIST helped them set up a microcredit bank, they
were also sharing  business  ideas  and helping  each other in different kinds of
projects. Another member explained that in the node meetings ”we discuss about
helping the students in the local school, helping the community.” It is thus clear
that by organizing people into groups,  TIST has spurred cooperation on other
matters as well, and has enhanced the organizational capacity. For the members
who neither attended node meetings nor cooperated within their small group, the
organizational capacity had naturally not increased.
Some members expressed that they perceive the project as meaningful.
For example, one member, who was temporarily the village priest, had started up a
tree plantation for the parish and the village school. He explained that the tree
planting would remain after he had left the village, and thought that others should
follow in his footsteps.
Two indicators of  psychological  capabilities were examined,  namely self-
confidence and ability to imagine and aspire to a better future. Regarding the self-
confidence it was clear that some of the members felt strengthened by the project.
For example,  one member said: ”Now that we are members and planting trees,
other villages are following us. We get new ideas, new knowledge, so we are feeling
happy.”
As  for  prospects  for  the  future,  one  member  explained  that  for  him,
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planting trees was a life insurance policy. If the family ever needs an extra income,
they can always sell some timber. However, none of the other members had much
aspirations for the future. One mentioned that he did not know what the market
situation for timber would be like in 20 years, so he could not count on a good
future income from the trees. Another member explained that the situation for
farmers in his area was very difficult. He thought that planting trees would help
him sustain a few more years compared to doing agriculture, but his situation was
still desperate: 
”I am not going to get enough money to feed my family, educate my
children, for my life needs. At some point, I will not have any money
at all. At that point I will move away from this village, to the city or
something, and look for a new job”.
These very pessimistic prospects for the future had only to a very limited extent
been affected by the TIST membership. 
In conclusion, the results show that TIST is empowering its members. TIST
clearly performs better on assets and capabilities than institutional climate. TIST
has increased all aspects of assets and capabilities, except human capabilities. The
institutional  climate  on  the  other  hand,  does  allow  the  farmers  to  actively
participate in the tree plantations, but not on broader issues regarding the project
design and priorities. Access to information is also poor. As for exit options, the
members can quit the project, both formally and economically. This indicates that
being a member brings net benefits to the farmer,  and also safeguards against
exploitation  of  the  farmers.  A  concluding  remark  is  that  very  few  of  the
empowerment aspects treated above redound to non-project members. Since only
men were members in the villages visited, women cannot be regarded as having
been empowered by TIST, which is a significant limitation.
4.6. Increased village-level market activity
Most of the interviewees had not received any carbon payments, and those who
had  considered  it  to  be  a  negligible  sum that  did  not  affect  their  economic
situation. Of the farmers expecting an increased income from the trees, no one
had  yet  got  any  yield.  None  of  the  members  had  thus  so  far  received  any
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substantial increase in income, which makes an increase in village-level market
activity implausible.
4.7. Accountability
As stated earlier,  the farmers'  access to information was very limited. This has
considerable implications for the accountability, since the farmers sometimes do
not know their rights, cannot identify who is responsible for a certain decision,
and do not have any means of contacting TIST in order to appeal a decision. In this
section, the farmers own experience of the accountability is examined. 
First of  all,  the farmers  take most decisions concerning  the plantations
themselves,  and  there  is  thus  no  need  for  accountability  concerning  these
decisions. Since exit options are good, the farmers can always leave the project in
case they are dissatisfied.  However,  as will  be seen below,  there are important
limits to the accountability within TIST. 
In  some  cases,  the  farmers  were  complaining  about  not  receiving  the
carbon payments  they had  been  promised.  Their limited  information did  not
enable them to identify who was responsible for the default; themselves, the local
TIST agent or the TIST main office. They also had limited means of  contacting
TIST and to hold someone accountable.
Some members were convinced that their local TIST agent took seedlings
and  sold  in  the  market  instead  of  distributing  them to  the  members.  These
members tried to contact a higher TIST official, who did not pay any attention at
all to the complaints. The TIST official did not take any measures to investigate or
rectify the issue, and the farmers had no means at all to hold their local agent
accountable. This was equally true for other members who did not even have a way
to get in contact with any higher official in TIST. Their only contact with TIST was
through their local agent, meaning that they were completely dependent on him
or her. 
In  conclusion,  the  limited  access  to  information  and  means  of
communication, in combination with no means to appeal decisions, leads to low
accountability within TIST.  Some farmers expressed feelings of  frustration and
resignation. The lack of accountability should therefore not only be considered a
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lack of positive impact, but also a negative impact since farmers feel powerless and
exploited.
4.8. Responsiveness to local needs
The  character  of  the  study  does  not  allow  for  doing  comparisons  on  the
responsiveness  to  local  needs,   which  means  the  potential  for  drawing  firm
conclusions  is  limited.  This  section  examines  the  farmers'  own experience  of
TIST's responsiveness to their needs, in order to see what indications can be found.
The  farmers'  experiences  varied  regarding  TIST's  responsiveness.  One
member said the TIST agent always began the node meetings by asking for the
farmers' needs and then strived to help them. Other members experienced that
TIST did not respond to their needs. 
Several  members  had  suggestions  on  how  to  improve  the  project.  For
example, one member suggested that TIST set up a partnership with purchasers in
order to get a higher price for the farmers. None of  the members had however
conveyed their ideas to TIST. It is not clear whether they thought TIST would not
bother, or if they simply had not had the opportunity to convey it. In any case, it is
a clear sign that TIST has not been successful in capturing their needs.
In conclusion, the farmers' experience of TIST' responsiveness to their need
varied,  but the method chosen for this study makes it  hard to draw any firm
conclusions. 
5. Conclusions
Keeping  the research  question  in  mind,  it  is  now time to  discuss  the results
presented above. To what extent has the CCBA's decentralization ambitions led to
the  advantages  asserted  by  advocates  of  community  governance?  In  order  to
answer the question, this chapter summarizes and analyzes key findings, before
drawing conclusions. All results are compiled in table 2, where each variable is
evaluated based on whether it has occurred within TIST or not. A reminder should
however be made of the limitations for drawing conclusions that result from the
methodological choices. No random sampling was done and no quantifications
can therefore be made. For example, the study cannot assess how common the 
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Table 2. TIST's positive and negative impacts on the local community.
Negative impacts Yes No Positive impacts Yes No
Corruption   X  Empowerment X
Inequality X Increased village-level market activity X
Elite capture X Accountability X
Changing group composition X Responsiveness to local needs X
Poor accountability X
form of corruption described earlier is, but can only assess that it does exist. 
As  for  the  outcome of  the  decentralization  strategy,  it  was  first  of  all
concluded that no considerable corruption was encountered  within TIST.  This
finding might be explained by TIST's project design, that neither leave much room
nor incentives for corruption.  Firstly, there are no middlemen in the distribution
of  money. The carbon payments that the farmers receive are never handled by
their local agent, but the money is directly transferred from TIST to the farmers'
account.  Secondly,  TIST  handles  only  small  amounts  of  money,  which  makes
corruption less attractive. The major economic benefit that the farmers receive is
from the trees. Since the farmers keep the property right of the trees, this income
goes  directly  to  them,  never  passing  through  TIST.  The  argument  that
decentralization leads to corruption is therefore found not to be true in this case.
If there were a risk for corruption, it might be overcome by a clever project design. 
TIST did give rise to some inequalities within villages, between villages and
between genders. TIST did in one case invite as project members only persons that
had  already  planted  trees,  an  already  economically  stronger  group,  thereby
increasing  existing  inequalities.  There  were  also  important  differences  in  the
support  different  members  got.  This  inequality  was  not  related  to  within-
community power relations, which the literature  commonly focuses on, but was
nevertheless  probably  a  result  of  the  decentralization  strategy.  Geographical
inequalities  are  often highlighted  when  discussing  decentralization  of
government, e.g. from state level to regional or local level.50 It does however not as
often occur in the context of natural resource management or development. It is
an important equity concern in this context too though, especially in TIST's case
50 See e.g. Pierre 2010, and Hague and Harrop 2010
31
since it is a market-based project where other market actors earn money from the
farmers'  participation.  One finding  of  the study is  therefore that geographical
inequality should not be neglected in this kind of projects. 
From a gender perspective, it is clear that TIST is not effective in including
women in the project. This could also be considered a form of elite capture, since
the dominating gender also dominates the project. The implication of this finding
is that decentralization does not automatically reverse power relations, and that
the causal relationship might be more complex. Decentralization might have to be
context-specific in order to reverse power relations. The critics of decentralization
are in other words found to be right regarding  the risk for inequality.  Just as
stressed in the literature, project implementers have, at least in part, adapted to an
unequal power structure, thereby rather reinforcing than reversing it.  No other
forms of elite capture were found however, which indicates that decentralization
does not  necessarily lead to elite capture. It might be, once again, that a clever
project  design could  avoid  the problem.  TIST has  decentralized  power to  the
household level, which might be a way of avoiding community-level elite capture.
It is however not effective at targeting within-household inequalities.
No change in group composition could be observed within TIST.  In the
literature, changing group composition is related to large inflows of  money. No
such inflows seem to have occurred in TIST, which might explain why the problem
of changing group composition has not occurred either. 
Regarding  empowerment,  one  can  argue  that  TIST  performs  better  on
individual assets and capabilities than on institutional climate. The results showed
clear  increases  in  both  material  well-being  and  social  and  psychological
capabilities. For example it was found, just as stressed in the literature, that by
organizing  people,  their  capacity  to  undertake  self-initiated  activities  was
strengthened, and social capital was increased. As for the institutional climate, the
results were mixed. The farmers' access to information was poor, in terms of both
knowledge about TIST and means of communication.  One main cause was that
the  node meetings  have  a  pivotal  role  for  information  sharing.  TIST  did  not
painstakingly enough inform the farmers about the meetings and make sure they
attended. This led to domino effects, since the farmers as a consequence did not
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receive information about other things either. Participation was only ensured on
matters  that  concerned  the  farmers'  own  plantations  but  not  on  the  general
functioning of the project, a pattern identified in the literature as being common
in  similar  projects.  Both  formal  and  practically  feasible  exit  options  did  exist
however, which is an important aspect of empowerment as it ensures that project
participation brings net benefits to the farmers. TIST can therefore be said to have
empowered  poor  people,  even  though  women  are  excluded  from  this
empowerment. 
No increase in village-level market activity was observed. Since the farmers
still  have not harvested the trees,  they are still  waiting for the main economic
benefits from the project. It might well be that the market activity is spurred later
on, but no such impact could be discovered by the time of research.
Accountability was poor,  which is not only considered a lack of  positive
impact,  but even a negative impact since some farmers experience  feelings of
frustration and resignation and  a sense of  powerlessness and exploitation. The
lack  of  accountability  relates  to  the  institutional  climate,  which  supports  the
statement above that the institutional climate might be a weaker part of  TIST.
Important  to  remember is  that  only  decisions  concerning  the plantations  are
actually  decentralized.  For  those  decisions,  accountability  is  good.  It  is  for
decisions made by TIST and the local agents that the accountability is low. Those
decisions are not possible to influence by the farmers. This study can therefore not
conclude whether inclusion in decision-making leads to better accountability. 
It was hard to draw any firm conclusions on the responsiveness to local
needs based on the method chosen for this study. The farmers' perceptions on the
responsiveness were mixed, ranging from good to low. 
What are the overall conclusions to be drawn from the results discussed
above? First of all, it is clear that the impacts from decentralization are not black-
and-white; both critics and advocates have important points to make. The positive
impacts found in this study mainly concern empowerment, whereas the negative
impacts are poor accountability and some increase in inequality. How should these
impacts be weighted? Firstly, one should remember that empowerment comprises
positive impacts on both material well-being, social capital and other social and
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psychological capabilities, and also some positive results on participation and exit
options. One could therefore argue that these impacts are more comprehensive
than  the  impacts  on  inequality  and  accountability,  and  that  TIST  should  be
considered generating net positive effects for the community. This conclusion is
supported by the farmers' own perceptions of the project (even though they did
not take inequality concerns into account). All farmers stated that it was overall a
good project, even though it could be improved in many ways. There was some
discontentment about the administration of  the project, and in some cases the
accountability.  But  in  general,  the  interviewees  all  thought  the  project  was
beneficial.  The fact that the interviewees stayed members, even though it would
have been easy to quit, also indicates that the project brought them net benefits.
The first conclusion is therefore that TIST has a slightly positive impact on the
local community. 
What does this conclusion imply from a theoretical perspective? As can be
remembered from the methodology chapter, TIST's project design makes it a likely
case for successful decentralization. In this light, TIST performs quite poorly. If not
even TIST, with its favorable conditions, gives rise to better results than this, one
can argue that decentralization probably does not lead to positive outcomes in
other cases with less favorable conditions. Before drawing any conclusions on this
point however, a caution should be made. During the field study, it appeared that
there were important differences in the functioning of the project across villages.
In one of the villages visited, there seemed to be no negative impacts at all from
the project,  while the positive impacts appeared to be much larger than in the
other villages.  The method  and  size of  sample of  the study do not  allow for
confirming these differences, but it might nonetheless be an indication that some
other factor than decentralization also affects the outcome. One such factor could
be  the  implementation  of  the  project.  It  could  for  example  be  that  well-
implemented  decentralization  leads  to  positive  outcomes  for  the  local
communities, whereas poor implementation opens up for negative impacts such as
corruption,  and  leads  to  inequalities.  This  hypothesis  cannot  be  proved  or
disproved within the scope of this study, but constitutes an interesting opening for
further  research.  The conclusion  is  therefore  that  the  results  from this  study
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indicate that decentralization in general might lead to quite poor outcomes for the
local community, but that this finding would have to be confirmed by testing for
other factors, such as implementation. 
From a societal perspective, it matters little whether the outcome is a result
of the decentralization strategy or of  poor implementation. In any case, CCB is
supposed to grant investors that their projects lead to net positive benefits for the
local community. As the results from this study have shown, CCB does grant net
positive benefits for the local  community,  but the benefits are fairly limited in
scope. It is the author's firm conviction that with a few small steps, the project
could be much improved and benefit the farmers considerably more. These steps
include improved access to information, especially regarding the farmers' rights
and responsibilities as project members, and active measures to empower women.
More  homogenous  implementation  across  villages  would  possibly  improve
equality between members and decrease corruption. Likewise, in order to increase
their  credibility,  CCB  could  improve  their  standards,  ensuring  that  certified
projects move on from ”not harming” to truly benefiting local communities. 
An opening for future research would be to study the biodiversity impacts
of  TIST and CCB.  TIST's major emphasize is  on community benefits,  whereas
biodiversity concerns are of secondary importance. Since TIST is found to perform
relatively poorly on the community aspect, it would be reasonable to expect their
environmental  outcome  to  be  fairly  poor  as  well.  As  for  the  author's  own
observations,  monocultures  and use of  pesticides and fertilizers  seemed to be
widespread.  It might be that both TIST and CCB could have higher standards
regarding biodiversity as well. 
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Appendix
Interview guide
I am a student from Sweden, Gothenburg. I am 24 years old, and I am currently
writing a Bachelor's thesis in environmental science and political science. That is
why I  am doing  these  interviews;  to  collect  information  for the  thesis.  I  am
interested in the TIST project and how it affects the participants, including you, so
the interview is going to be about your experience of TIST. Your participation is
very important to me and I hope that the results from my study can also be of
interest and help to you and others within TIST.
The TIST staff or anybody else from TIST or its partners will not get to know what
you have told  me,  and  you will  be completely  anonymous in  the study.  Your
answers will not be possible to trace back to you. Me and [name of interpreter] are
the only ones who are going to hear this. So I would like to ask you to be honest
and speak freely about anything you think about; like I mentioned before I am
interested in your own, personal experience. 
Is it okay with you if I record the interview? 
Do you have any questions before we start?
 Warm-up questions
How came you joined the TIST project?
Has joining TIST affected you and your family in any way? How?
 Capabilities
Has joining TIST changed the level of  health of  you and your family? Level of  
education?
Within  your  Small  Group,  do  you  cooperate  on  other  matters  that  are  not  
directly related to TIST?
With other TIST members?
Generally speaking, do you think the other village members can be trusted, or  
do you think that you need to be very careful in dealing with them? 
Has this view changed in any way after joining TIST?
Do you have any prospects for the future for you and your family? Have they  
changed since joining TIST?
Do you feel that you have the power to make important decisions that change  
the course of your life? (eg education, changing profession) Has this feeling
changed in any way after joining TIST?
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 Economic well-being and local market
Has the economic situation of your family changed due to joining TIST?
If yes, in what way?
Have you noticed any difference at the local market after the establishment of  
TIST? E.g. Number of  vendors, people buying more/less, people changed  
their purchase patterns?
 Distribution of power
Would you say that there are any persons who more easily achieve their will within
your Small Group or Group Center?
If  yes,  who  are  these  persons?  What  was  their  position  within  the  
village/community before TIST?
How is the leader of  the Small Group and the Group Center selected? Do you  
believe that you could be a leader? If no, why not?
Is the leadership rotating? Between whom does it rotate?
If conflicts arise within the Small Group or between Small Groups, how are these  
conflicts resolved?
Are there any sanctions if anyone within the Small Group violates the common 
rules? If yes, what are the sanctions like?
 Equality
Within  your  Small  Group,  how  do  you  decide  how  the  money  and  other  
benefits from the project (fruit, fire wood..) are distributed?
Are there any persons who receive more or less than others at the distribution?
If yes, who are these persons? 
Do you believe that this distribution is equal? Why/why not?
 Participation
When there is a decision to be made within your Small Group, how does this  
usually come about?
Within  the  Group  Center?  Within  TIST  as  an  organization,  as  you  
perceive it?
During which parts of the project have you had a say? 
Planning the project,  budgeting,  implementation of  the project in your  
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village, monitoring, evaluation. 
Do you believe there is any way for you to convey your own priorities,  needs,  
prefereces  within  TIST?  Do  you  believe  that  these  are  taken  into  
account? 
Are there any kinds of  decisions where you would like to have a say, but have  
not got so?
The way decisions are made, do you perceive it as fair, in general? Within both 
Small Group, Group Center and TIST.
 Accountability (incl. voice + exit) 
Have you ever been dissatisfied with any decision that has concerned TIST? 
If  no: if  you were dissatisfied with any decision that concerns you, would you  
know who is responsible for that decision? Would there be any way to  
call for change?
Explanation: all types of decisions; planning, budgeting, implementing, and  
monitoring,  Could  also  be  decision  that  have  been  made  but  never  
implemented.  Decisions made both within the Small Group and within  
TIST.
If  yes,  when  that  happened,  did  you  know  who  was  responsible  for  that  
decision? 
Could you address that person/group and demand change? 
Was  it  possible  to  hold  accountable  the  person/group who made the  
decision? In what way?
If you would like to quit TIST, would that be possible? 
Easy or difficult?
 Access to information
How much information do you get regarding TIST? Too much, too little?
Is any information regarding the distribution of money within TIST available to 
you? (TIST budget etc)
If there is any information you want or need from TIST, do you believe you get 
it? Is it easy or hard to get?
Has  the  TIST  project  changed  your  access  to  computers  or  other  
communication technologies?
 Corruption
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Are the benefits from TIST (such as money, education etc) provided according  
to fixed rules and regulations? 
Do you know of any person who, in the past 12 months, paid a bribe in any form 
to anyone involved in the TIST project?
Do  you  know  of  any  person  who,  in  the  past  12  months,  had  to  pay  any  
additional fees or give gifts to get things done within the frame of TIST?
Do  you  believe  that  anybody  within  TIST  has  taken  advantage  of  his/her  
position to benefit himself/herself or a family member of friend?
Do you believe that this sort of  phenomena has increased or decreased in the  
village in general after the introduction of TIST?
 Emigration 
Do you know if  any person(s) have moved from the area after TIST started up  
here? If yes, do you know why they moved? 
Was the relocation related to TIST?
Could  you  describe  the  persons  who moved  (sex,  age,  socioeconomic  
status)?
 Personal information
Age?
Sex?
Caste?
What does your family live from (primary source of income)?
Compared to the rest of the village, are you high class, higher middle class, lower  
middle class, or low class?
 Rounding up..
My  last  question  to  you  is,  what  do  you  think  about  the  TIST  program in  
general? Do you think it's a good or a bad project? 
These were my questions. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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